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Sunday, April 15, 2018

Super Toil Across Years Begets Power

The current phase of India’s rel­ationship with the United States took root in the early 1980s, when Indira Gandhi abandoned her socialist pretensions and moved to reconcile with the power she believed had tried to overthrow her in the run-up to the Emergency.
From the Indian side, there came a search for investments and technology; from the US, a desire to displace the Soviets and, after the Tiananmen Square massacres, a durable partner to balance China. Thereafter, there were many ups and downs, but in the past decade it has largely been up, coinciding, no doubt, with China’s trajectory.
Earlier this month, Ken­neth I. Juster, the new US ambassador to India, delivered his first major speech to foreign policy wonks in New Delhi. Speaking to assembled think-­tankers, columnists, journalists and a phalanx of retired Indian diplomats, Juster spoke about the goal of  building a durable partnership between India and the US in the 21st century. Such speeches are not new, but the value of Juster’s remarks are in the fact that they were delivered by the envoy of Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the US, whose mission seems to be to upend everything the US has stood for and done.
Being the seasoned diplomat that he is, Juster punched all the right buttons—his personal friendship with India, our common values and interests, the Indo-Pacific Region, the strategic partnership, defence and counter-terrorism, econo­mic and commercial relations, energy and environment, science & technology and health, and regional cooperation.
India has been lucky that it has got an ambassador of Juster’s calibre, someone who knows India and has played a significant role in altering the texture of the India-US relationship for the better. He has a profound understanding of the dyn­amics of this relationship as he was a key official in the Dep­art­ment of Commerce when India and the US est­ablished the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partner­ship’ that worked its way into the India-US nuclear deal.
Juster highlighted the important element of trust. But, in all fairness, it is not immanent in the relationship as it is, say, among the ‘Five Eyes’. It is something of a work in progress, requiring detailed legal commitments on the part of India, as on the case of the 123 Agreement, or the General Security of Military Information Agr­eement (GSOMIA) and the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), as well as the ones that are still pending—the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geospatial intelligence.
Since World War II, the US has largely worked in an environment where its allies and friends have also been states for whom it is the net security provider. India, a nuclear weapons state with a large military, does not quite fall into that category. The Americans are now beginning to understand this and have gone along with tailoring many of their “foundational” agre­ements to suit their Indian friend.
Juster’s description of the process, involving “respect, trust, acceptance confidence and resilience and constancy” has not been easy, and neither has it happened overnight. It is an ongoing process that began with the Gandhi-Reagan Science and Technology Initiative of 1984.
That brings us to the idea expressed by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar first, and more recently in the new Trump National Security Strategy (NSS), that India is “a leading power” in the Indo-Pacific region. Truth be told, at present India remains a “balancing power” and Jaishankar’s 2015 reference related to India’s aspiration to be a leading power, rather than an assertion of being one. Some Indian commentators have decided that India is already a leading power and a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region. To act on this would be a grave error. Fortunately, the US wants us to only play a balancing role in the Pacific Ocean, and sees the “leading” role somewhere in the unspecified future.
We, too, want the Ame­ricans to be balancers in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. This is where the Indo-Pacific con­­cept comes in. By str­etching the Western Pac­ific into the Indian Ocean, China looks smaller. As is evident, even though China is a force in the Wes­tern Pacific, it is still some distance away from that position in the Indian Ocean Region. It is still useful to have its foremost power, the US in your corner, especially when your own military mod­­­er­­nisation and reform are not going anywhere.
As I heard Juster, a question came to my mind, one that had been nagging me since the time we initiated a strategic dialogue with the US in 1989-90. He spoke of the entire gamut of India-US relations and referred to the US NSS. Yet there was complete silence about an India-US role in a region that is unarguably the most important for us—the reg­ion between Pakistan and Israel, call it West Asia or the Middle East. Sixty per cent of our oil comes from there, seven million of our nationals work there, sending back $39 billion per annum, much more than the self-anointed pat­riots of North America. Dubai, an entrepot, is India’s third largest trade destination, after China and the US.
By no metric is the Indo-Pacific as imp­ortant for India as is the northern Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Issues like freedom of navigation and overflight are significant, but these are world order issues, important everywhere. In contrast, the volatility of the Persian Gulf region stands out. Just three years ago, India had to send its navy to rescue nearly 5,000 citizens from Yemen. We have had to launch similar operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2014, Lebanon in 2006 and in 1990 we carried out the biggest airlift in history to get 1,75,000 Indian nationals out of Kuwait.
This is also an area where Indian interests diverge from that of the US. The US is no longer critically dependent on the oil exports from the region, as we are. On the other hand, the US remains committed (it has an entire fleet and several military bases in the region) for three reasons—to ensure that the jehad virus (which it helped create) does not spread to Saudi Arabia or Egypt, to protect Israel and to ensure that the oil res­ources of the region do not fall into the hands of any combination of hostile powers. And then, there is Pakistan, which is sui generis.
India shares most US goals, but they are complicated by America’s Israel mission which, too would be okay, exc­ept that the US wants regime change in  Iran, a dreadful prospect knowing what happened when it obtained one in Iraq. Iran is the most proximate major source of oil for India and has an anchor role in India’s Central Asian and European connectivity plans through its ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas.
The India-US agenda is larger than the Middle East, as Juster outlined. But the region looms much larger for us than for the US. Our differing goals are not ­unbridgeable, but if we are indeed to evolve a durable strategic partnership in the 21st century, we need to, at least, begin a conversation about this region. But all Juster did was to dust-off an old idea of posting Indian liaison officers to US combatant commands, here, the CentCom. Given the differing ways our militaries relate to government, this was a non-starter and remains one.
Juster detailed India-US cooperation in defence through joint exercises, defence trade and military exchanges. India is a Major Defence Partner of the US, which provides us access to technologies at a level equivalent of its closest allies and partners. Like all countries, the US would rather sell finished products than provide technology, no matter what it says. Like all countries, the US will not part with its technology crown jewels for anyone, even its closest allies. Incidentally, according to Reuters, President Trump is getting set to announce a new policy to further boost the sales of US military equipment around the world, using American embassies to “become a sales force for defence contractors”.
In the mid-1990s, in a visit to the Pentagon, Commander Charley Dale explained to me the differing ways with which India and America approached the issue. They appeared to work on different algorithms. The Indians dem­anded technology from the US as proof of its friendship, while the Americans suggested that India prove the friendship before the US delivered on the technology.
We should not fetishise technology acquisition for its own sake. Exploiting  the advanced technology the US or anyone else may be willing to transfer makes sense only if India has an R&D and manufacturing base which is capable of absorbing it. Right now we do not, and neither are we showing signs that we have a plan to create one.
Politically, we are at a fortunate intersection where India’s interests largely coincide with the US, which will remain the dominant global power well into this century. We are also lucky that our needs coincide. There are, as we have indicated, important areas where our interests are not entirely congruent. The onus is on us to work out ways to bring the US around.
The Trump administration offers us a strategic opportunity on par with that of the junior George Bush. Trump is not burdened by history, nor restrained by bureaucracy, and seems favourably inc­lined to India. He wants to dista­nce himself from the Obama administration and his team has, in fact, picked up several formulations mooted by India, such as ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘leading power’. Indeed, even Rex Tillerson’s fulmination against China’s predatory economic behavior probably leads off from the Indian critique of the BRI.
There is one factor on which we need clearer thinking—time. Actually, the kind of relationship we need to foster is the one the Chinese developed in the period after 1972 when they used the US need to counter the Soviet Union to set themselves on to a trajectory which is taking them to a status of a true world power. But that process has taken the better part of a half-century.
Juster indirectly addressed this point when he said India should get over doubts about the durability of the India-US relationship. Reviewing his 17 years of experience, he said that “a strong foundation” had been laid and the time had now come to move beyond “our growing pains” and create a long-term relationship. In other words, we still have some way to go.
Whether the US can help us to become a great manufacturing power or a politico-military leading power, it can only happen in the span of the political lives of several prime ministers, and possibly political regimes. Hype and grandstanding are part of the process but, must alw­ays be subordinate to careful planning and a dash of modesty. The Americans can give us a leg up, but in the arduous path, there are no short cuts.
Outlook January 29, 2018

A strong India-US partnership is the best balancer to China’s growing power

In 2007, James Mann, a former Beijing correspondent for the Los Angeles Times penned a slim book titled “The China Fantasy” whose real punch lay in its subtitle: “Why capitalism will not bring democracy to China.”
At the time the book was dismissed as a “curious polemic” that went against the grain of the prevailing wisdom that over time, China would progressively liberalise and become a democracy, just as South Korea and Taiwan had. Successive administrations argued that the goal of American policy must be to “integrate China into the international community.” And a slew of specialists forecast the eventual democratic future of China.
Looking back at America’s China hallucination, you can speculate whether it was the Americans who deluded themselves or that they were cleverly played by the Chinese. As recently as 2012, Chinese leaders like its Premier Wen Jiabao spoke of the need for political reform and democracy. Often this was carefully tailored for global audiences such as, in one instance, a meeting of the World Economic Forum.
After 2017, that illusion is gone. As the Trump administration’s new national security strategy laments, “for decades, US policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post war international order would liberalise China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others.” The US suddenly realises that not only is China a competitor, but it could well be a principal threat to the American homeland and its global primacy.
America’s global hegemony is the sum total of its domination in various regions of the world like Europe, Middle East, or East Asia. Today when the Americans look at East Asia, they see a hugely enriched and militarily powerful China increasingly challenging them.
This is where India comes in, as a principal balancer of China in a region now termed the “Indo-Pacific”. China looms large in the western Pacific, even though the US remains the most powerful nation from the military point of view. But Japan, tainted by its past, even now finds it difficult to assume a larger role in the security of the region. Vietnam and Australia lack heft and are economically dependent on China.
By stretching the region to incorporate India and the Indian Ocean, China looks smaller. India’s economy may be a fifth of China’s and its military much weaker, but its size, location and potential make it a peer competitor of China. By mid-century, India’s economy could exceed that of the US and be second only to China. And you can be sure, this will be accompanied by the rise of Indian military capacity as well.
Because of its border dispute and the China-Pakistan relationship, New Delhi has never had any illusions about China. It has actively engaged Beijing, and made no bones that it sees it as an adversary. In recent years, as China surged economically and militarily, things have become a bit difficult. Beijing is now expanding its reach in South Asia. It has recently taken a 99-year lease of Hambantota Port that it had earlier built; this month, a coalition of pro-China Communist parties have swept the elections in Nepal and the Maldives has ratified an FTA with China. Chinese naval vessels, rare in the Indian Ocean a decade ago, are now deployed routinely. And last week, the visiting Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi blandly told India that China disapproves of the concept of spheres of influence.
Under its new strategy, the US promises that it “will help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region.” It also says it will support India in its “leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.” India needs the US, as much as the Americans need us.
The arrival of Xi Jinping as the most powerful political figure since Deng Xiaoping has changed things. Far from liberalizing, Xi is doubling down on the hold of the Communist Party on the country. Xi’s speech and in the recent 19th Party Congress was a profound rejection of western values, particularly liberal democracy. His idea of reform is the need to build an efficient authoritarian state which he offered as a model for other countries.
If the Pakistan experience is anything to go by, we must accept that it is uncommonly difficult for the US to get rid of its international fantasies. Even so, in word and deed till now, the Trump administration is sold on the Indian partnership. There is an opportunity here which can serve us well, if we relentlessly pursue the national interest and not get distracted by illusions, of which we have our own share.
Hindustan Times, January 12, 2018

Bibi Persuades Modi to Take Back Spike Deal & Here’s How it Helps

If the prime minister of India is your friend, you can do many things, even revive an arms deal that has recently been cancelled by his Ministry of Defence. Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu has demonstrated this by persuading Modi to allow the recently cancelled Spike anti-tank missile deal to get back on track.
In this case, at least, “friend” Modi has taken the right decision. The deal for the fourth generation anti-tank missile Spike had been struck in 2014. India has a larger need for some 40,000 anti-tank missiles and the 8,000 or so Spike missiles would fill only part of its requirement but they are urgently needed

Why Spike is Ideal for Cross-Border Raids

It’s not clear which versions India wanted, but they appear to be a mix of the medium range (MR) and short-range (SR) versions of the missile light enough to be carried into battle by infantrymen and Special Forces for use against tanks and hardened enemy positions.
The missile is a tried and tested system, having been used by over 20 countries and seen action in Israel’s various regional wars since its invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Two months ago, the Ministry of Defence had cancelled the $500 million deal which would have also seen it being produced in India through technology transfer. They had, instead, decided to back the DRDO which had claimed that it would develop a system based on its Nag NAMICA system within  four years.
The Spike has seen constant enhancement in its technology since the 1980s. The latest version of Spike SR has a missile that is 98 cm long. Its disposable control launch unit weighs 1.2 kg with battery, and the missile and launch tube together weigh 8.6 kg. The total weight of the system is just under 10 kg. According to Jane’s 360, there is no other missile which knocks out targets between 50 m and 1.5 km in this weight class currently in production.
Over the years the Israelis have refined the system which has ensured that the missile does not have a separate booster to push it out of the launch tube, the task being done by a single unified motor. The Imaging Infrared sensor locks on to the target day or night and it has a proprietary fixed seeker which has a wide angle of vision. The operator locks on to the target using the missile’s seeker, fires it and the missile finds its own way to the target.
As is evident, it is an ideal missile for the Special Forces to carry in cross-border raids.
DRDO’s Ability to Deliver Nag on Time is Dubious
The DRDO’s anti-tank missile Nag is a non-starter for this task. It is simply too big and heavy for a single soldier to carry. It weighs 42 kg and has a length of 1.9 metre, and therefore has to be mounted on a vehicle or helicopter.
A September 2017 report suggested that the DRDO would begin work on a portable Nag which would weigh around 14 kg. But a similar report had earlier suggested that DRDO was beginning work on this in 2015 as well. Clearly, as of now they have no product and as the reports suggest, they have now promised a “world class missile” in 2022.
The DRDO’s ability to deliver on time is highly suspect and the army faced the prospect of having no missiles for the foreseeable future to replace their obsolete systems.
Since the Spike would fit only part of the Army’s needs, the DRDO’s Nag can still find its place in the balance of the Army’s requirements for a missile that can be carried on infantry combat vehicles and the attack helicopters of the army. However, it’s not clear that the DRDO’s product would fit the bill unless it actually goes through the tests.
There have been  varying claims of the success of the two Nag NAMICA tests that had taken place in September 2017. While the DRDO claimed they were a great success, Indian Army said that the tests had only been partially successful and postponed the induction of the missile till further tests were conducted. If this was the case with a missile that has been nearly 30 years in development, it will be some time before the DRDO can come up with missile that can match the Spike.
Perhaps the DRDO can take a leaf out of its own book and do a joint venture with Israeli companies to produce an anti-tank missile. After trying in vain to develop world-class surface-to-air missiles, the DRDO tied up successfully with the Israelis to develop the medium and long-range surface to air missiles which will equip all three Indian services in the future.
The Quint January 19, 2018

The Trump policy on Iran

The Trump Administration’s decision, on Friday,  to continue waiving sanctions relating to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal is good news for the world and India. However, and somewhat ominously, Trump said that this was the last waiver he would issue.  Which means in four months, we will confront the possibility of the deal collapsing and its attendant consequences.
In addition, the US issued  new sanctions against 14 Iranian officials and institutions relating to human rights, its ballistic missile programme and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). New sanctions have been issued against the head of Iran’s judiciary Sadegh Larijani  and a cyber warfare unit accused of internet censorship and this could further roil relations between Iran and the US.
It is no secret that Trump hates the Iran deal and had threatened to talk away from it, but since taking over as President, he has waived sanctions for the third time. By law, the US President is required to certify to its Congress every 90 days as to whether Iran is complying with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Agreement that it signed with six world powers to limit its nuclear programme. In October 2017, Trump refused to certify the agreement and is since been issuing waivers on the sanctions that he is mandated to impose.
Trump now wants to work with the European powers who were behind the deal and push for a follow on agreement which would impose new conditions on Teheran. Trump’s ideas are contained in amendments to the  Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). This would mandate that Iran allow timely and sufficient inspection of all its sites by international inspectors, that Iran does not come close to getting nuclear weapons.
However, while UK may want to go with the US on this, Germany, France,  are not likely to follow and China and Russia most certainly not.
The Europeans have been categorical in opposing any efforts to re-write the deal. On Thursday, the Europeans made it clear that they support the JCPOA. In Brussels, Federica Mogherini, the EU foreign policy chief said that while there were concerns about Iran’s development of ballistic missiles and other activities in the Middle East, they could be dealt with as a separate issue. But this would require Chinese and Russian cooperation as well as that of the Iranians, something that looks unlikely.
That is why there has been a big debate within the US about the Presidential waiver. Some have argued that the recent political protests are an opportunity to further push Iran to the point where the people overthrow the mullah-led government. However, others say that pressure would actually do the opposite—generate support for the government. Whatever it is, the US is poorly equipped to handle the issue because so far the US has been looking at the issue through only a military perspective. But while the protests have convinced the President that the Iranian leadership must be punished, the Europeans believe that the deal should be preserved.  
The Americans realise that they lack significant diplomatic heft to push the Europeans, but their real problem is that they want to re-write the deal which was achieved through very tough negotiations.The JCPOA was worked out through a UN Security Council resolution with monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency which must certify that Iran is complying with its side of the deal which includes limiting its enrichment of uranium, reducing its heavy water stockpiles,  dismantling centrifuges, pouring cement over the core of the Arak reactor.  So far the IAEA which has got unprecedented access to the programme,  has certified that Iran is in compliance with its part of the deal.
From the outset there has been little trust between Iran and the US. So while Iran has continued ballistic missile testing, the US has continued its sanctions through using the issue of  human rights and terrorism and many international companies have stayed away from Iran so as not to get entangled in US laws.
Trump’s policy has two pillars—the dismantling of a deal worked out by his predecessor Barack Obama which has been criticized by Israel as well. And containing Iranian activism in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. The American policy is strongly influenced by the military men in his administration, people like the National Security Adviser H R McMaster who commanded American forces in Iraq.
Supporters of the deal say that it had a single focus—prevent Iran from going nuclear. Other issues such as ballistic missiles, Iranian activities in Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq were not part of the arrangement. Those who thought that the deal alone would transform Iranian behaviour towards the US and its allies were unduly optimistic.
A breakdown of the deal and tension in the Persian Gulf has implications for India which imports significant quantities of Iranian oil and is also committed to building the Chah Bahar project.
Greater Kashmir January 15, 2018

Why Balochistan has become a thorn in Pakistan's crown

On Saturday, Abdul Quddus Bizenjo of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), the so-called kings' party of the Musharraf era, took over as chief minister of Balochistan along with a 14-member cabinet. He is the third chief minister in four and a half years.
Bizenjo replaced Sanaullah Zehri of the PML (Nawaz), who was forced to resign from office ahead of a no-confidence motion against him. Not surprisingly, 11 of the 14 incoming cabinet members are members of the PML(N).
Army interference
Most observers see this manoeuvre as the Pakistan Army’s move to punish former PM Nawaz Sharif by depriving his party of any sustenance. If anything, this is a sign that parties and ideology don’t matter in official Baloch politics, but it is individuals who are easily open to manipulation. In fact, Bizenjo won the 2013 election with just 544 votes cast in his favour. The turnout in his constituency was just 1.18 per cent.
In 2013, PML(N) won a majority of seats and formed a coalition government and selected a middle-class Baloch nationalist, Abdul Malik Baloch of the National Party as chief minister. But Malik had to make way for Zehri in 2015. Baloch nationalists opposed the elections and many boycotted the process. Even those who did participate, such as Sardar Akhtar Mengal, the leader of the Balochistan National Party, rejected the outcome, charging authorities with manipulating the results.
Balochistan has suffered from prolonged political turmoil and successive phases of insurgency and violent religious extremism. The most recent bout of violence began in 2003 and is still continuing. In the period between 2011 and 2016, nearly 4,000 people were killed, including 1,000 classed as terrorists, who could be separatists or sectarian killers who target Shias in the Quetta area.
In 2017, violence intensified with massive bombings in Quetta, and other areas targeting Shias, Sufis and security forces. At the end of the year, a bomb blast killed nine and injured 57 people when a Methodist Church was targeted by the Islamic State. The Pakistan Army has sought to use violent religious extremist groups to counter Baloch nationalism and blame India for the violence.
baloch-copy_011518092148.jpg
Banking on China
There are of course nationalist groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Army and Baloch Liberation Front. Pakistani authorities focus their ire on Brahamdagh Bugti of the BRA as the principal villain because he is openly pro-Indian and has even sought political asylum in India. But actually, most Baloch nationalists reject secession in favour of greater autonomy and the groups are hopelessly divided along tribal lines.
Balochistan has now come into international focus because of a report that the Chinese may be establishing a naval base on the Jiwani peninsula, adjoining the port they built and operate in Gwadar. Not many are taken in by Beijing’s denial. As for Gwadar, it is the starting point of CPEC, which has become a flagship scheme of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Pakistan claims Chinese investments will generate jobs and prosperity for everyone, including the Baloch. The government believes that once the mega projects kick in, Baloch nationalism will lose steam.
There is an element of wishful thinking in the Pakistani belief that CPEC will be an answer to all its problems and moderate Baloch nationalism. They believe the Baloch live in a feudal environment, dominated by their sardars and once the area is opened up, things will change.
Blaming India
Pakistani authorities have shown little sophistication in addressing the challenge of violence in the province whose roots go back to the sensitive issue of Baloch identity. The Pakistani state, especially the Army, tends to see Baloch nationalism as a threat to Pakistan’s integrity.
In recent years, Pakistan has sought to introduce the “Indian hand” as the cause of problems. They cited Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s references in his Independence Day speech in 2016 and their capture of naval officer Kubhushan Jadhav to back their claims. However, Modi’s reference was innocuous to say the least and as for Jadhav, there is no real proof that he was involved in doing anything in Balochistan.
Politics are not normal in Pakistan, and even less so Balochistan. Violence and political turbulence are, of course, there, but the real problem is that it is somehow not seen as being part of the Pakistani mainstream. By and large, its parties are electoral coalitions that rise and come apart depending on the exigencies of power. Sentiments are with Baloch nationalists, but authority is exercised by an elite which is backed by the Army.
Mail Today January 15, 2018

Beyond Modi-Bibi Bonhomie, Limits of Indian-Israeli Convergence

In the Modi era, India-Israel relations exist in two planes. The first is the normal one of friendly relations between two states who have had normal diplomatic relations since 1992 and, from India’s point of view, have a strategic dimension based on Israel’s capacities in the area of technology.
The second is visible through the prism of BJP/RSS’s adulation for the Jewish state because of its achievement in not only recovering the purity of its ancient civilisation in the face of alleged Islamic hostility, but vigorously defending it with its military might thereafter.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be in New Delhi this week in return for Modi’s 2017 visit, the first ever by an Indian Prime Minister. It will be another occasion to see how these two planes intersect.
Bonhomie Between Modi and ‘Bibi’
We are likely to see enhanced movement in a range of areas such as military-technical trade and cooperation, agriculture, water technology, renewable energy, healthcare and cyber security. At the same time, no doubt, there will also be gestures by the government to signal its special feelings for Israel.
Modi’s July 2017 visit was an event in itself. He pointedly avoided visiting Ramallah, the capital of Palestine in the same tour, and paid homage at the tomb of Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism. There was easy informality between Netanyahu and him as they strolled on the beach. Modi addressed his Israeli counterpart by his nickname “Bibi”, and there were numerous trademark ‘Modi hugs’.
Early enough Netanyahu, not the most popular man in the world, sensed the opportunity that Modi and the BJP’s uncritical admiration provided his country. He was the first to congratulate Modi on his election as Prime Minister in 2014. Subsequently, high level exchanges between the two countries intensified with mutual visits of their respective Presidents and ministers, Modi’s Israel-visit in 2017 and now Netanyahu’s visit to India.

Walking a Tightrope

  • Netanyahu’s visit likely to see enhanced movement in areas such as military-technical trade and cooperation, agriculture, water technology, etc
  • Early enough, Netanyahu sensed the opportunity that Modi and the BJP’s uncritical admiration provided his country.
  • From supporting nuclear weapons programme in the 1970s to providing assistance during the Kargil War, Israel has been India’s key ally.
  • While BJP might admire Israel’s tough military posture, India can’t afford such a stand as terrorists, in our case, are backed by a nuclear weapons state.
  • Trump can take a tough stand on Jerusalem, but India has to step carefully in a region where it has vital interests.

Ties with Israel Since the 1950s

India has had important and pragmatic ties with Israel since the 1950s. In the 1970s, the Israelis reportedly gave a leg-up to India’s nuclear weapons programme through the important RAW and Mossad relationship. In the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, Israeli experts advised India on setting up VIP security.
In the 1990s, Israel became a means through which technologies, which the US denied to us, could come through. This became important for Tel Aviv after the US embargoed certain kinds of technologies to China.
The direct benefit was India’s AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) which has been built with Israeli electronics on a Russian airframe. Israel also gave a boost to the Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme by agreeing to supply its Green Pine radar.
Israeli assistance during the Kargil War of 1999 has helped shape the relationship of today, which sees Israeli Searcher and Heron drones, Barak surface-to-air missiles, and AWACS aircraft in the Indian armoury.
In addition, Israel provided unspecified sensor technology for India’s border fence on the Line of Control with Pakistan. Perhaps the most ambitious project currently underway is $2 billion medium and long range surface-to-air missile system, jointly developed by several Israeli companies and the DRDO. Equally important in the mid-2000s, it provided India with RISAT-2, its first radar imaging satellite.

India Offers Economic Opportunity But Security Dimension is Different

The positive trajectory of relations between the two countries had been set well before Modi and Netanyahu became Prime Ministers.
Even so, having a government of a party which has an almost fawning attitude towards Israel is a big plus, especially since that country is a respected member of the Non Aligned Movement. Equally important is the opportunity that an economically flourishing India provides for Israeli companies.
Of course, India stands to benefit a great deal from Israel, whether it is in the area of technology, or in creating an eco-system that encourages technology development, whether it is for the civilian sector or the military. But we should not overstate the security dimension.
The security scenarios of the two countries could not be more different. Israel cannot afford any major military or terrorist setback on its territory, whereas India can absorb a lot. Many Indians, especially those close to the BJP, admire Israel’s tough military posture which involves periodic cross-border strikes against its enemies. Israel can carry out those strikes because it has total air superiority against its non-state actor adversaries. Unlike Israel, our terrorists are backed by a nuclear weapons state.

Limits of Indian-Israeli Convergence

But is Israel safer, despite its repeated invasions and attacks in Gaza and Lebanon? Where India has managed to successfully eliminate Khalistani terrorism and contain its Islamist variety, successive Israeli military operations have ended up with its enemies becoming more dangerous.
Israel’s problem is not Islamist extremism per se, but a people whose land it is militarily occupying. Israel sees no contradiction in achieving Jewish nationality in Palestine by depriving the Muslim and Christian Palestinians of their nationhood. This may have a resonance with some Hindutva forces, who would not mind marginalising and dis-empowering Muslim citizens of the country, but is not acceptable to the world.
This was evident in the recent UN resolution criticising the US decision to name Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and calling for an end to its military occupation of Palestinian territories. India’s support for the resolution indicated the limits to the Indian-Israeli convergence. This is but natural – the two countries do not have an identity of interests. Israel may be a nuclear power, but its real influence lies through its ties with the US.
India Has to Tread Carefully
A larger part of India is also friendly to the US, but it has a more complex regional agenda, which involves a difficult US friend, Pakistan, and balancing relations between Tel Aviv, Teheran and Riyadh. Trump can do the sword dance in Riyadh and recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, but India has to step carefully in a region where it has vital interests. And hence Modi’s return to the region, probably next month, to visit UAE, Palestine and Jordan.
There is little doubt that in terms of its economic achievements and military power, Israel flies high in its region.
But the real existential challenge is in making a soft landing. Either it agrees to the two-state solution mooted by most countries, or it becomes travesty of a democracy which keeps millions of people in captivity, a prospect guaranteed to generate perpetual insecurity.
The Quint January 13, 2018